Nativism as a determining factor in Syria/Iraq and neighboring states – exposing historic reasons for dissemblance in Southwest Asia

by
Ron Alexander Ph.D.

In Syria and Iraq, secular or sectarian officials, combatant offenders or defenders, leadership groups display their continued inability to quit historic factors that once shaped the cultures of the region. As they view the demographic milieu, their competitive group values will drive only a narrow understanding of their future.

Since the beginning of Syria’s Civil war in 2011, the Assad regime has not planned the routes that can save the regime and its ancillary political structures from the depressive carnage of war on multiethnic, religious and territorial entities.

Abbasid Caliphate

Not unlike the suspicions. hostilities, and warfare found in early Twenty-first century Iraq and Syria, the Abbasid Caliphate, formed in Southwest Asia from 750 to 1517, also existed with unpopular, political rule. Excluding the effects of the Abbasid Civil War (809-827) and its repercussions that justified the decentralization of caliphate operations on extended provinces, the establishment of social and military elites dominated in Damascus, Baghdad and Al-Raqqah.

Al-Raqqah, located in north-central Syria, expanded its dimensions, incorporating al-Rāfiqah, a nearby military garrison constructed in the late 8th century and used by a Khorasanian army, a Persian trained contingent. Located on the north bank of the Euphrates River, Al-Raqqah lay east of Aleppo nd strategically held access to Damascus and Baghdad. From 796 to 809, the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid consolidated his rule, making Al-Raqqah the capital of the Abbasid empire, an empire that included territory to the the west, in North Africa, and to its eastern boundaries, in Central Asia.

This period of social-economic hegemony unsealed the Golden Age of Islam. At the same time, methods to administer compliance to a leader’s or group’s habitual, customary actions, injunctions and commands developed, in various ways, under different rulers, whether secular or sectarian or forging a combination of both domains.

In order to secure a smooth transition in leadership, Harun al-Rashid anointed his son, Muhammad ibn Harun al-Rashid, also known as al-Amin, as the next in line to head the Abyssinian regime. To secure his office, he began a civil war to oppose any possible threat from his brother, Abū Jaʿfar Abdullāh al-Maʾmūn ibn Harūn. Through his father, Al-Maʾmūn had received the governorship of Khurasan.

To resolve this conflict, al-Maʾmūn appointed Tahir ibn Husayn, an Iranian general, in support of Harun’s decisions and in opposition to al-Amin’s method of fratricide. Consequently, al-Amin lost control of Baghdad, caused by a reduction in forces, implementation of urban, insurgent tactics, population displacement, dwindling supplies and a serious prison disturbance.

After al-Maʾmūn took control of Baghdad he instituted the Miḥnah, or inquisition, and moved the teachings of al-Muʿtazilah, a school of thought in Basra, Iraq, developed by Wasil ibn Ata, introducing reason as the method to understanding religious doctrines, secular justice and its administration. The term is based on an Arabic verb structure meaning to “separate or segregate”. In the case of al-Maʾmūn, as caliph, it contains reasons for his removal from authority those not in support of his rule. Al-Muʿtazilah was also named Ahl al-Tawḥīd wa l-ʿAḍl, “people of unity and justice”.

Neo-Separatist

In the modernity of the twenty-first century, the term al-Tawhid means something similar, even under the torturous movements of extreme separatist organizations, the Taliban and the Islamic State group. A Jordanian national, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi established the Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, “Organization of Monotheism and Jihad”. The first iteration of this group worked from 1999 to 2004. Once he pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden’s group, al-Qaeda, it opened the second iteration, on October 17, 2004, using the designator al-Qaeda in Iraq, or Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. In that respect, this social-political orbit includes the Islamic State group.

These current separatist have also “withdrawn” from the “people of unity and justice”, for they need to reinvent former religious works to modify sensate or ideational reasoning. Their choice in pursuing a separate, independent existence within a caliphate discourages an interdependent world that stresses more functional interactions. Aside from the inclusion of the word “ al-Tawḥīd” in the separatist mottos, it actually supports the opposite domain.

In the marriage relationship, the husband can “separate” from his wife with three announcements of his intentions. “Infadda”, meaning “to separate” also means “to disperse, to scatter”. “Intifada”, meaning “to throw off”, “to revolt” has a similar pronunciation with “Infadda”.

At the same time, the use of black flags carried by members of Jihadist groups, forms from the Abbasid Revolution, under the leadership of Abu Muslim Abd al-Rahman ibn Muslim Khorasani, al-Khurasani. Imprinting a Shahada, with its white, inscriptive testimony, on the banner signals today’s push to recruit foreign fighters, suicided bombers and other separatist designs and beliefs.

The army that Abu Muslim’s lead extended its interests when lifting the black flags of Khorasan, in revolt of the Umayyad caliphate. His strategy and tactics succeeded in supplanting Umayyad rule and enthroning the Abbasid caliph. The oft mentioned “Khorasan Group” stems from this culture of eighth and ninth century leaders that assisted the materialistic development of the caliphates in Southwestern Asia.

The Jihadist black flag, like other previous factors that manipulate stimulus-response behaviours, illustrates the effect of specific influence upon members of combatant groups. The former flags of the Abbasid caliphs and their allies influenced a small number of cohorts. In the early Twenty-first century, the usage of mobile phones, computers and the Internet communicates more messages to a larger field of recruit-receptors. “Shock and Awe” does not need to locate only on a battlefield when electronic gadgetry produces a similar effect.

Consequences of globalization
Thus, the fitness of individuals that join these combative groups present as individuals who carry a weakened adaptive and cognitive capacity. They retain learned and heritable biases toward not only western standards but seek relevance in a carnival of pain and suffering, supervised by overlords that remain hard-wired into their own obscured, ancestral environment.

To concern oneself with horrible acts that the West has allegedly committed upon Muslims, conceals the true reason for participating in “jihad”. Working to institute a new caliphate may have minor variations from less extreme forms of disputes regarding secular or sectarian change. To believe that immediacy bears no causal effects pushes the mind into suspended reasoning and allows adaption to choose a violent and false appearance.

Peace actualizes tendencies towards peace. Perturbations caused by extreme violence not only moves people away from the source of that behaviour but towards the source. Globalization and localization thus affect demographic regions differently. At the same instance, many leave the dominance of the global village and try to develop another, more idealistic local village.

This idealized version of reality can not exist in the current market place of images, ideas, organized interactions and institutions. For in the local village, societal integration on the state level has already taken hold, since before the nineteenth century.

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